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RALP'S RAMBLING RESILIENCE NUMBER
OR HOW BIG IS YOUR TAU TODAY?
Carl Walters
July 23, 1975
It strikes me that resilience indicators and measures
ought to be defined in relation to the policy environment for
the system in question. It may be that natural systems
flip about among a series of stability regions under the in-
fluence of natural perturbations, but we would only be con-
cerned about the resilience of such systems if we could see
that some policy might change the boundary locations or in-
troduce new perturbations: resilience is a comparative con-
cept.
Policy Environments
My intent in this note is to develop a resilience indi-
cator that explicitly takes policy issues into account. In
arriving at the indicator, I have assumed that any policy en-
vironment has four basic features:
(1) there is a nominal or baseline policy that would be
followed if no one were concerned about resilience.
(2) policy changes are limited to an incremental domain
set by political and economic conditions and by the
perceived level of risk associated with continuing
the nominal policy.
(3) there is some goal structure that can be mapped as a
satisficing region or utility structure on the system
state space.
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(4) the locations of stability boundaries, catastrophe
folds, and the like are not known; subjective as-
sessments about these locations take the form of a
risk mapping on the state space.
These elements can be shown graphically in our inevit-
able predator-prey phase space as:
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G - goal region (may have internal dynamic features like
catastrophe folds, etc.)
N - nominal trajectory implied if current policy is
followed for a long time.
R - contours of increasing risk that system recovery will
be impossibly costly within a reasonable time scale.
ｾ - deviation from nominal trajectory that would result
by applying the largest policy change that is believed
to be possible.
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I believe that it is also necessary to assume some "manage-
ment time-scale" or time horizon within which we would want
to be sure to reach the desired region G (resilience issues
are meaningless otherwise - all nautral systems will even-
tually go extinct or be destroyed). A critical feature of
the policy environment is that it is defined by a series of
subjective factors: every decision maker will perceive a
different set of constraints, possible actions, and risks.
Thus any resilience measure that derives from analysis of
this environment is also a subjective measure - different
decision makers will assess different values for it.
The Tau Indicator
Referring to the definitions above, let me now define
the resilience index T as the maximum amount of time that
the nominal policy N could be safely followed and still allow
the system to be brought into the goal region G by applic-
ation of incremental policy changes Ｈ ｾ Ｉ after time T has
elapsed. Graphically, T has the interpretation:
Figure 2
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In this example, the nominal policy can be followed up to
times t l , t 2 , or T, and the goal region can be reached after-
ward by policy changes. On the other hand, changes beginning
at time t 3 and afterward are not successful, at least within
whatever arbitrary management time scale is defined by the
plotted trajectories. Intuitively, T measures the amount
of time that the manager can safely wait before he must in-
stitute some possibly painful policy change. A key word in
the definition is "safely": every policy-influenced trajectory
traces a path through the risk contours of Figure 1 and as
such courts at least some probability and magnitude of disaster.
Values of T less than 0 imply that no feasable policy changes
(as perceived by the manager who establishes ｾ Ｉ will be suf-
ficient to reach the goal region.
Suppose next that: (1) we can calculate some measure
g that reflects how badly the nominal trajectory will miss
the goal region, and (2) we can measure incremental policy
changes on a quantitative scale d. Then we can represent
the effect of changing goals and increasing flexibility Ｈ ｾ ｾ d)
to make incremental policy changes on the system's resilience
as measured by T:
Figure 3
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This graph simply asserts that for a given "policy flexibility"
d, goals that are more disparate from the nominal trajectory
are more likely to be unreachable (T < 0). Likewise foro-any
disparity g, larger policy flexibility d is needed to insure
that T ｾ O. Thus in an inverse objective function sense, T
measures either the variety of alternative goals that could
be reached with a given flexibility d, or the amount of flexi-
bility d that could be lost while still permitting the achieve-
ment of those goals represented by any fixed deviation g.
A major complicating factor is that the permissable1policy
changes (d) are likely to be related to risk levels along the
trajectory:
Figure 4
Thus larger policy changes may be possible after the nominal
or altered trajectory has entered a high risk region of the
phase space.
Perhaps I can clarify some aspects of the T notion by
reference to related concepts. News magazines recently have
carried many stories on the financial plight of New York city,
with its political tradition of "brinksmanship": the Big
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Apple government seems always to wait until disaster is
imminent before instituting changes in financial ｾ ｯ ｬ ｩ ｣ ｹ Ｎ In
short, they wait until T approaches 0 and gamble on a pattern
like Figure 4 to give them enough flexibility to save the
day. In cybernetics, we worry about Ashby's Law of Requisite
Variety: how much flexibility Ｈ ｾ or d) is necessary in order
to control a complex system? In my option foreclosure dis-
cussions, I argued that managerial flexibility (options avail-
able) often decreases over time - thus pushing T toward neg-
ative values. Sergio Rinaldi tells me that control theorists
would view the computation of T as a problem in "constrained
controllability".
Examples from IIASA Case Studies
There is a strong possibility that we will be able to
calculate T indicators for the IIASA case systems now being
used for resilience comparisons. The following section attempts
to give more precise definitions through case examples for the
fuzzy concepts outlined in the previous section.
1. The Budworm
Much of the resilience and stability analysis in the
budworm study has been in relation to single "sites", or 6 x 9
mile grid areas. Budworm dynamics over New Brunswick as a
whole can be represented as:
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Budworm policies are defined in terms of total areas and
locations of tree cutting and insecticide spraying. For eco-
nomic and political reasons, these controls can only be chang-
ed rather slowly; it may be that no real control will ever
be possible over the location of forest cutting. It appears
that the best long run goal would be to generate and maintain
a spatially diverse (mixed age) forest with small budworm out-
breaks going on all the time. We do not yet know if there is
a feasable policy for reaching and maintaining this goal
given present constraints on cutting and sparying. My guess is
that such a policy does exist, but that it would have been
necessary to implement it at least 15 years ago in order to
reach the goal state by around the year 2000 (a reasonable
time horizon?). Thus my guess is that T = -15. Note that the
nominal policy, based on myopic local decisions for cutting
and spraying, would never achieve the goal.
2. Haefele Societal Equations
The societal equations for energy development pose
another kind of problem, in which there are at least two
alternative goal regions and high uncertainty about which
region is best. Graphically, there are two alternatives for
nominal policy trajectories:
e
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In the left-hand case, goal Gl is considered best at first,
and 1 = 0 represents the last point along the nominal policy
trajectory N
l
for which it is possible to implement policy
changes so as to recross the separatrix A and head toward
the alternative goal G2 . In the right-hand case, G2 is con-
sidered best and 1 = 0 represents the last point along policy
trajectory N for which it is possible to move back across
2
the separatrix A. The two graphs can be combined to define
a "resilience region" of alternative state combinations for
which it remains possible to change the ultimate goal:
e
1=0
Figure 7
In this case, incremental policy changes are related to rates
of investment in new energy sources and to changes in public
acceptance of risks. We could consider the nominal trajector-
ies Nl and N2 as the "pure market cases", in which market
penetration of alternative energy sources is not affected by
public policy. Then modified trajectories represent various
degrees of public investment and control: in this example,
the concept of limited policy changes due to political and
economic constraints becomes quite clear.
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In essence it appears that many arguments about eco-
logical doom are based on the implicit notion that we are
already too far along trajectory N2 , so that t < 0 now. This
is not saying that basic resources will be exhausted soon,
but rather that we are no longer capable of corrective policy
responses if unexpected limits do appear - a most frightening
possibility indeed.
3. Fisheries development
Virtually all of the world's fisheries are operated as
"open-entry" predator-prey systems, with no control on the
dynamics of fishing fleet (predator) development. Most inter-
national fishing agreements specify very precisely that only
the catches should be controlled, through quotas that are
periodically adjusted. The experience has been that quotas
are quite difficult to change in the face of economic pres-
sures, and fishing investment increases until the quota is
distributed across such a large fleet that profits (incentives
for further investment) disappear. There is a possibility to
control the predators through license limitation schemes and
through subsidy-taxation policies that modify the investment
dynamics; but such policies could only be implemented and
changed very slowly without causing excessive economic and
social hardship.
Fishery development can be represented in a predator-
prey phase space:
-10-
Fishing
Fleet
---
It'b.
r----- ........
- ......
,- '"
I \
\ I
'- ./ T = 0
T > 0
Fish population
Nl - nominal policy with no catch quotas (no management
at all)
N2 - nominal policy with quotas for population protection
but no economic control
ｾ _ policy with some quota and economic control
G - goal region with productive population and reasonable
fishing profits
Quota management (policies like N2 above), has developed under
the very explicit recognition that low populations (shaded
area above) may cross some boundary after which extinction is
inevitable.
For the fishing example it is simple to give a quantita-
tive interpretation to the concept that incremental policy
changes are strongly constrained:
taxation +
rate
o
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Figure 9
o - current policy
D - domain of possible policies after one time step into
the future (usually one year in fisheries)
,
d - a particular incremental policy change (to policy 0)
;
D - domain of possible policies at time t + 2, given that
,
policy 0 is followed at time t + 1.
In this example the domain D is drawn to illustrate a special
problem: once policy change has been initiated (e.g. some
tax rate has been applied and accepted), larger policy changes
(wider range of taxation rates) may afterwards be possible.
4. Obergurgl Growth
We have argued that this alpine village is facing economic
disaster through overdevelopment for tourism. The village
economy is now in very good shape, but there is a large cohort
of young people (10-15 years old) who will soon be demanding
opportunities to enter the tourist industry by building their
own hotels. The land available for building is very small
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and in its natural state (meadows and pastures) is of major
aesthetic value and economic importance (ski slopes, appear-
ance to tourists). The situation has developed:
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policy maker who seeks some quantitative justification for
policy change or some indication of how urgent it is to
implement some recommended change. As an object for intel-
lectual study, T involves ｰ ｡ ｾ ｦ ｵ ｬ ambiguities since it can
only be defined in relation to highly subjective assessments
about limits on policy change; in a sense this makes it an
especially challenging problem. As an object for evaluation
in our workshops involving scientists and policy makers, T
might form a very useful focus for discussions leading to
clearer statements of policy objectives and constraints.
